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Abstract 
We consider whether pollution-intensive FDI tends to outflow from a country which maintains 
stringent environmental regulations and into countries with weak environmental regulations. 
We consider this issue by incorporating the predictions from the recent heterogeneous firm 
models of international trade into an empirical model of outward FDI by UK firms. We find 
that environmental regulations are not a robustly significant determinant of the 
internationalisation decision, but a pollution-intensive multinational enterprise’s location 
decision will be affected by the environmental regime in place in the host country. Any 
deterrent effect is however highly conditional upon other factors, notably corruption. 
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The pollution haven hypothesis states that the production of pollution intensive goods will migrate from 
countries in which environmental standards are high to those in which they are low.  
 
Providing robust empirical support for the pollution haven hypothesis has proved difficult. Focusing on FDI 
flows, the empirical evidence which looks at U.S. inward FDI and differences in pollution abatement 
among U.S. states has arguably had most success in establishing an effect. Studies which consider the 
relocation patterns of plants within the U.S. are also in favour of a statistically significant role for 
environmental regulations. For non-U.S. countries, the support for the pollution haven hypothesis has 
been more mixed. 
 
Within the pollution haven literature less attention has been paid to the question of whether pollution-
intensive FDI tends to outflow from a country which maintains stringent environmental regulations and into 
countries with weak environmental regulations (typically developing countries). The limited evidence 
suggests that environmental standards are only a minor consideration in investment decisions. 
 
In this paper we add to this literature by incorporating the predictions from the recent heterogeneous firm 
models of international trade into our empirical model of outward FDI by UK firms. As these models make 
clear, differences in the underlying characteristics of firms mean that even when faced with the same set 
of choices about global engagement, only the best firms in the industry are sufficiently productive to cover 
the sunk costs associated with FDI. In addition to the standard industry level measures of environmental 
regulation it is therefore important to control for firm characteristics in the modelling of outward FDI. We 
also study the choice about which locations to host that production. If the sunk costs of becoming a 
multinational differ across countries and the weakest environmental regulations are in countries with the 
highest entry costs, then only a small fraction of multinational firms will able to take advantage of these 
differences in environment regulation. If potential pollution havens instead have lower entry costs, in 
comparison the pollution haven effect will encourage a greater proportion of multinationals to locate 
production there.  
 
We test whether there is a significant pollution haven effect for the UK because it is subject to relatively 
stringent environmental regulations which are strongly enforced, whilst also being one of the largest 
outward investors of the world economy.  
 
We find that, controlling for firm performance, environmental regulations are not a robustly significant 
determinant of the internationalisation decision made by a firm. On the other-hand, if it is costly for the 
multinational enterprise to comply with stringent environmental regulations, its location decision will be 
affected by the environmental regime in place in the host country. Any deterrent effect is however highly 
conditional upon other factors, notably how corrupt the host country is. Corruption significantly weakens 
the negative effect more stringent environmental regulation has on FDI flows to a given host country. In 
contrast to many previous studies, we establish results that are highly robust across a variety of different 
model specifications and estimation techniques. 
 1 Introduction
The pollution haven hypothesis states that the production of pollution intensive goods will migrate from
countries in which environmental standards are high to those in which they are low. Given the strong
correlation between environmental regulation and per capita income, for some this has the additional
connotation that developed countries use developing countries as the location of pollution intensive pro-
duction.
The early theoretical literature captures the idea of pollution havens as di⁄erences in the comparative
advantage of countries in the production of pollution intensive goods (Pethig (1976), Siebert (1977) and
Yohe (1979)). Copeland and Taylor (1994) extend the analysis by endogenising environmental policy
such that it depends upon national income. In these models of environmental regulations and trade,
a country￿ s comparative advantage in pollution-intensive industries is weakened by strict environmental
regulation, thereby reducing its net exports from such sectors. On the other-hand, those countries
which do not maintain high environmental standards increase their specialisation in pollution-intensive
industries. Models have also been developed to show that similar results hold for capital ￿ ows (McGuire
(1982)). If any factor of production is freely mobile across frontiers, environmental regulation will drive out
the regulated industry from the more to the less regulated economy. More recently, however, Eskeland and
Harrison (2003) show that the e⁄ect of environmental regulation imposed at home on outward investment
may be ambiguous due to a possible complementarity between capital and pollution abatement.
In comparison to the theoretical modelling of the pollution haven hypothesis, providing robust em-
pirical support has proved more di¢ cult. Focusing on FDI ￿ ows, the empirical evidence which looks
at U.S. inward FDI and di⁄erences in pollution abatement among U.S. states has arguably had most
success in establishing an e⁄ect. List and Co (2000) and Keller and Levinson (2002) both ￿nd evidence
that increased environmental regulation is associated with lower FDI in￿ ows into U.S. states. Typically,
it is argued that this approach has the advantage that while environmental regulations are known to
di⁄er across states, other di¢ cult to measure country and industry di⁄erences that matter for FDI do
not, or at least di⁄er relatively little (Keller and Levinson, 2002).1 For non-U.S. countries, Waldkirch
1Related to this literature are studies which do not explicitly consider FDI but rather the relocation patterns of plants
within the U.S., such as Levinson (1996), Henderson (1996) and List et al. (2003). Here the evidence points to a statistically
1and Gopinath (2008) measure the stringency of environmental regulation and FDI in￿ ows into Mexico,
Dean et al. (2009) the case of China and Smarzynska and Wei (2004) FDI ￿ ows into Eastern and Central
European countries. Here the support for the pollution haven hypothesis has been more mixed. Wald-
kirch and Gopinath (2008) ￿nd a positive correlation between FDI and one of their measures of pollution
(sulphur dioxide) although only for a few industries (in particular, those with large ￿rms). In the case of
other pollutants, and for other industries, the results suggest that environmental regulations enforcing a
lower emission intensity may not necessarily deter FDI ￿ ows, ceteris paribus. Smarzynska and Wei (2004)
￿nd that their results are not robust to di⁄erent measures of environmental stringency, while Dean et al.
(2009) ￿nd an e⁄ect only for joint ventures in pollution intensive industries funded through Hong Kong,
Macao and Taiwan.
Within the pollution haven literature rather less attention has been paid to the question of whether
pollution-intensive FDI tends to out￿ ow from a country which maintains stringent environmental reg-
ulations and into countries with weak environmental regulations, including developing countries. Early
studies for the U.S. include Duerksen and Leonard (1980), who examine both trade and investment data
in an e⁄ort to uncover a pollution haven e⁄ect. They ￿nd that U.S. FDI in pollution-intensive industries
has not increased signi￿cantly in developing countries relative to developed countries. Overall, they argue
that environmental standards are only a minor consideration in investment decisions. Similar results are
obtained by Walter (1982) in a study of FDI by ￿rms located in the U.S., Europe and Japan for the
period 1970 to 1978. Finally, Xing and Kolstad (2002) ￿nd some evidence for outward FDI from heavily
polluting U.S. industries (chemicals and primary metals).
In this paper we add to this literature by incorporating the predictions from the recent heterogeneous
￿rm models of international trade, pioneered amongst others by Melitz (2003) and Helpman, Melitz
and Yeaple (2004), into our empirical model of outward FDI by UK ￿rms. As these models make
clear, di⁄erences in the underlying characteristics of ￿rms, captured in theory as productivity di⁄erences,
mean that even when faced with the same set of choices about global engagement, which presumably
will include the incentives to avoid environmental regulation in the home market, only the best ￿rms
in the industry are su¢ ciently productive to cover the sunk costs associated with FDI. Empirically
signi￿cant role for environmental regulations.
2this suggests that in addition to the standard industry level measures of environmental regulation it is
therefore important to control for ￿rm characteristics in the modelling of outward FDI and that changes in
environmental regulation may only a⁄ect the choices of a relatively small number of ￿rms. We also study
a second extensive margin to outward FDI; the choice about which locations to host that production.
If the sunk costs of becoming a multinational di⁄er across countries and the weakest environmental
regulations are in countries that are culturally and physically distant, i.e. those with the highest entry
costs, then only a small fraction of multinational ￿rms will able to take advantage of these di⁄erences
in environment regulation. If potential pollution havens instead have greater proximity to the home
country and therefore lower entry costs, in comparison the pollution haven e⁄ect will encourage a greater
proportion of multinationals to locate production there. Across these two questions we therefore focus
on the ￿ who￿and the ￿ where￿components of the pollution haven hypothesis.
In terms of the empirical methodology the paper is closest to that of Yeaple (forthcoming) who exam-
ines the location choices of U.S. multinationals, while from the environmental literature only Smarzynska
and Wei (2004) have modelled the pollution haven hypothesis in this way. To the best of our knowledge,
no previous studies have considered whether there is a pollution haven e⁄ect from environmental regu-
lation for the UK. This is despite the fact that the UK is subject to relatively stringent environmental
regulations which are strongly enforced,2 whilst also being one of the major outward investors of the
world economy. In fact, the UK was the second largest outward investor in 2007, with a stock of FDI
out￿ ows that exceeded $1.7 trillion (UN, 2008).
From the analysis we ￿nd that, controlling for ￿rm performance, environmental regulations are not a
robustly signi￿cant determinant of the internationalisation decision made by a ￿rm. On the other-hand,
there is strong evidence to suggest that if it is costly for the multinational enterprise (MNE) to comply
with stringent environmental regulations, its location decision will be a⁄ected by the environmental
regime in place in the host country. Any e⁄ect is however highly conditional upon other factors, notably
how corrupt the host country is. Relaxing environmental regulations in an uncorrupt country has a
signi￿cantly positive e⁄ect on the probability a MNE locates there, but there is no e⁄ect if the country
2The 2007 Executive Opinion Survey ranked the UK fourteenth out of 131 countries in terms of the overall stringency
of its environmental regulations (World Economic Forum, 2007)
3is highly corrupt. In contrast to many previous studies, we establish results that are highly robust across
a variety of di⁄erent model speci￿cations and estimation techniques.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. The next section describes the simple econometric
framework employed. Section 3 then presents our data, focusing in particular on the environmental
variables. In section 4 we present and discuss our results and perform a range of robustness checks.
Finally, section 5 concludes.
2 Econometric Methodology
If the pollution haven e⁄ect from UK environmental regulation is an important determinant of the
internationalisation decision made by ￿rms we would anticipate that, controlling for all other ￿rm and
industry characteristics, UK ￿rms in industries with high environmental compliance costs would be more
likely to own a¢ liates abroad than those in industries with low environmental compliance costs. This is
tested in this paper using a Probit regression equation of the following form:
Subsidiaryi = ￿0 + ￿1EnvironmentalCostsj + ￿2Xi + ￿3Yj + "i (1)
for ￿rm i in industry j. Subsidiary is a binary variable which takes a value of 1 if the ￿rm has one
or more foreign subsidiaries and 0 if it does not. EnvironmentalCosts is a measure of environmental
compliance costs in industry j. A positive and signi￿cant value for ￿1 would indeed suggest that UK
￿rms in industries for which it is costly to comply with the environmental regulations are more likely
to be MNEs. Mindful of the possible correlation between our measure of environmental costs and other
factors that in￿ uence the domestic return to investment (relative to abroad) within an industry we also
include other industry factors thought to be important in determining outward FDI decisions, namely
measures of the physical capital intensity, human capital intensity, and technological intensity (R&D
expenditure). These are included in the vector Y . Caves (1982), Helpman (1984) and Brainard (1993)
emphasise the importance of factor proportions to explaining the pattern of foreign direct investment.
In addition, previous studies using U.S. data have shown that pollution intensive sectors, which will
have high environmental compliance costs, are also generally physical capital intensive (e.g. Antweiler
et al. (2001)). A possible explanation is that the greater use of machinery and equipment by industry
4may generate more pollution. Cole et al. (2005) ￿nd a relationship between human capital intensive
manufacturing UK industries and pollution intensity. They suggest this could be because skilled labour
is required to maintain complex industrial processes, which often generate more pollution. We also include
R&D because its importance to FDI is stressed by the intangible asset theory of foreign investment (as
developed by Horstmann and Markusen, 1989).
We control for di⁄erences in the characteristics of ￿rms within the vector X. Multinational ￿rms
have been consistently found to have superior performance characteristics compared to non-exporters
(Helpman et al., 2004). We would therefore anticipate that the better ￿rms within an industry are more
likely to be multinationals. As speci￿ed above, equation (1) assumes that all ￿rms in the sample are
a⁄ected in the same way by EnvironmentalCosts and the control variables. However, we expect the
coe¢ cients to vary over the sample. For example, a relatively unproductive ￿rm might not become a
MNE regardless of the extent stringent UK environmental regulations increase that industry￿ s costs. On
the other-hand, highly productive ￿rms may be signi￿cantly a⁄ected. We therefore introduce interaction
terms to account for such possible ￿rm behaviour. Finally " is an error term.
A second component of the pollution haven hypothesis is where ￿rms choose to locate. The stringency
of the environmental regulations in the destination countries is an important element of the pollution
haven hypothesis. Even if regression (1) reveals that ￿rms in industries with high environmental costs
are more likely to become MNEs, it could be that these ￿rms are locating their subsidiaries in countries
with equally or more stringent environmental regulations than the UK. This would suggest other country
factors are more important in the location decision.
We consider the factors that determine where UK MNEs locate their foreign subsidiaries by estimating
a Probit estimation of the form:
SubsidiaryLocationi;m = ￿0 + ￿1Xi + ￿2Industryj + ￿3EnvironmentalRegm
+￿4EnvironmentalRegm ￿ MediumCostsj
+￿5EnvironmentalRegm ￿ HighCostsj + ￿5Zm + "i;m (2)
for ￿rm i and country m. SubsidiaryLocation takes a value of 1 if the MNE has one or more subsidiaries
in a given destination country and 0 otherwise. Hence for each MNE we now have one observation for
5every country included in the dataset. This gives a total of i￿m observations. X as before is a vector of
￿rm-level control variables. Here we anticipate that even amongst multinational ￿rms, those with better
performance characteristics are more likely to operate subsidiaries in more locations. As the pollution
haven hypothesis does not provide de￿nite predictions regarding the e⁄ect an industry￿ s environmental
costs has on the probability that a MNE in that industry will locate in a given country, we control
for any industry wide factors using Industry which is a vector of time invariant (two-digit) industry
e⁄ects. EnvironmentalReg is the stringency of environmental regulation in the destination country m.
MediumCosts is a dummy variable for ￿rms in medium environmental cost industries, and HighCosts is
a dummy variable for ￿rms in high environmental cost industries. Finally, Z is a vector of country-level
controls.
Equation (2) includes interaction terms between our measure of a country￿ s environmental standards
and dummy variables categorising the costs of complying with UK environmental regulation in the ￿rms￿
industry as medium or high. Low environmental compliance cost industries are the reference (omitted)
category. These slope dummies allow for the possibility that UK FDI with high domestic environmental
expenditures become relatively more attracted to host countries with weak environmental regulation.
This is a direct corollary of the pollution haven hypothesis. Hence if this is the case, ￿4 and ￿5 should
both be negative and signi￿cant, with ￿4 < ￿5. On the other-hand, ￿3 should be insigni￿cant because
￿rms with low environmental costs should not be a⁄ected by the stringency of environmental regulations
in host countries when choosing where to locate subsidiaries.
3 Data
The primary source of the ￿rm-level data is the FAME (Financial Analysis Made Easy) dataset, published
by Bureau van Dijk. From this database, we focus our analysis on UK manufacturing ￿rms, which have
a UK SIC(1992) code of 15-36 and are classi￿ed at the four-digit UK SIC(1992) level. Information is
available on whether or not each ￿rm has foreign subsidiaries and, if the ￿rm does, in which countries
they are located. Although the ￿rms are observed within a 10 year window (1996 to 2005), information on
foreign subsidiaries is however only observed in the last year. Hence our ￿rm data are for the year 2005.
This is a weakness of the available data, although one common to that found elsewhere in the literature
6(Smarzynska and Wei, 2004). We accordingly assume that the stock of FDI in 2005 is determined by a
set of exogenous variables measured at that point in time. If the cross-industry di⁄erences in pollution
abatement are persistent across industries, this may mean we capture the long-run e⁄ects of the pollution
abatement hypothesis in using the stock of FDI. If they are not then this may make it less likely we ￿nd
evidence in support of the pollution haven hypothesis. Mindful of this issue we explore the sensitivity of
our ￿ndings to measures of the pollution variables at di⁄erent points in time.
Figure 1 displays the aggregate outward FDI ￿ ows of the UK manufacturing sector between 1990 and
2005.3 This shows that outward FDI ￿ ows in manufacturing peaked in the late 1990s. In fact, total
outward manufacturing FDI over 1990 to 1997 was exceeded by the following three years alone (1998,
1999 and 2000), before falling away again over 2001, 2002 and 2003. Hence it is likely that a large
proportion of the MNEs in our dataset made their location decisions, and invested in a sunk start-up
cost, in 1998, 1999 and 2000. In this case, changes in the characteristics of countries after this time might
have had relatively little in￿ uence on the decision of many of the MNEs regarding where they should
locate their a¢ liates. Similarly, the period is su¢ ciently long that any disinvestments are likely to have
been completed. We therefore perform robustness checks of regression (2) in which country variables
(EnvironmentalReg and Z) are measured in the year 2000.
3.1 Environmental variables
To estimate regression equations (1) and (2) we wish to ￿nd a measure of the costs that ￿rms must
undertake to meet the requirements of the environmental legislation (EnvironmentalCosts). We follow
the approach established by the existing literature by using pollution abatement costs (scaled by value
added) as a measure of environmental compliance costs.
The 2005 pollution abatement operating cost data we use are collected by the UK Environmental
Protection Expenditure Survey, which has run over the period 2001-2006. We refer to this measure
as EnvironmentalCosts. These data are de￿ned as all in-house expenditure in 2005 associated with
the operation of pollution control abatement equipment and payments to external organisations for
environmental services. This includes labour costs, leasing payments and maintenance costs for equipment
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Figure 1: UK Outward FDI Flow
and payments made to others for the treatment and disposal of waste. Although this is the most detailed
data available for the UK, it is available only at the two-digit SIC level. We also explore the robustness of
our ￿ndings to more detailed pollution abatement cost data for the year 2005 for the U.S. (PACE 2005).4
The PACE data have been published at the six-digit NAICS level (equivalent to four-digit SIC).5 This
data makes clear that there is a large spread in abatement costs within many ￿ve-digit NAICS industries,
let alone the three-digit NAICS (which is equivalent to the two-digit SIC).
Although pollution abatement costs have become a widely used measure of the EnvironmentalCosts
variable, there are criticisms of this approach. Firstly, using a single measure of abatement costs for
all ￿rms within a particular industry overlooks the fact that in the UK the stringency of environmental
regulation is determined to some extent at the local level. In the case of the UK, Cole et al. (2005) explain
how this is the result of informal as well as formal regulation. Therefore although a ￿rm may be in a
particularly dirty industry, if it is also located in a region with relatively lax environmental regulations,
4The PACE survey was originally conducted annually between 1973 and 1994 (with the exception of 1987), but was
discontinued after 1994 by the US Census Bureau for budgetary reasons.
5The 2005 PACE data are classi￿ed according to NAICS(2002). Nonetheless, importing these pollution abatement
costs into the FAME dataset is not problematic because NAICS(2007) codes are available for each ￿rm in FAME, and the
NAICS(2007) and NAICS(2002) classi￿cation codes are very similar (only a few six-digit manufacturing sectors change).
More detail on the treatment of the U.S. pollution abatement cost data is provided in the Appendix.
8it could have far lower abatement costs than the industry average. One potential method for overcoming
this caveat is to adjust the industry level measure of abatement costs according to the region in which
the ￿rm is located, and how stringent environmental regulations are in that region. Unfortunately, data
are not available to allow us to weight the EnvironmentalCosts variable in this way and we must accept
we therefore capture an industry average e⁄ect, although it is only likely to a⁄ect the question of the
decision to become a MNE (not the location of a¢ liates).
Secondly, if many plants with high environmental costs within a particular industry have already o⁄-
shored pollution intensive production this will tend to lower the measure of domestic pollution abatement
expenditure for the industry. While the use of ￿rm-level FDI data might be seen to reduce the usual
concern of endogeneity between abatement expenditure and industry FDI ￿ ows, we remain concerned by
this point. This again motivates us to establish the robustness of our ￿ndings to the use of abatement cost
data from an earlier time period. If at this earlier time, fewer ￿rms have o⁄shored their dirty production
then the current stock of FDI is less likely to have a⁄ected the environmental costs variable in that earlier
year. In fact, using past pollution abatement cost data could overestimate the e⁄ect of industry-level
endogeneity. This is because abatement costs (scaled by value added) of dirty industries tended to be
higher in the past relative to other industries not simply because they had not o⁄shored their production,
but also because they had not invested as much in newer and greener technologies. Thus if we ￿nd using
this data that the results remain robust, we can be reasonably sure that the endogeneity of abatement
expenditure is not a problem.
The earliest year in which the Environmental Protection Expenditure survey data are available for
the UK is 2001. However, from Figure 1 we can see that large outward FDI ￿ ows had already taken place
by this time. Hence the same problem could remain for this data. We therefore focus on the sensitivity
of our ￿ndings to U.S. PACE survey data for 1994.
For equation (2) we require a country-level measure of the stringency of environmental regulations
(EnvironmentalReg). For this task we employ a qualitative measure of environmental regulations using
a variable taken from the Executive Opinion Survey (World Economic Forum, 2006), which featured 125
developed and developing countries. This survey, conducted in the early months of 2006, asked business
9executives to assess the "overall stringency of environmental regulation and enforcement" in their country
on a scale of 1 to 7. Here 1 is de￿ned as "lax compared to most countries" and 7 as "among the world￿ s
most stringent". In total, 11,232 responses were used for the 2006 survey. This variable has been used
only by two previous studies which we are aware of; Wagner and Timmins (forthcoming) and Kellenberg
(2009). As pointed out by Wager and Timmins (forthcoming), it has the advantage of avoiding the
aforementioned endogeneity problems associated with pollution abatement cost variables, and it is also
available for a far wider range of countries than measures used in previous studies. In addition, unlike
other qualitative measures, it accounts not only for the stringency of environmental regulation but also
the extent to which it is being enforced.
A common criticism of such survey data is that it may exhibit a "perceptions bias", i.e. respondents in
a given economy systematically provide overly optimistic or pessimistic responses. The Executive Opinion
Survey aims to minimise any such bias in three ways. Firstly, the raw data are subjected to rigorous
quality control processes. Outliers are excluded, in particular answers which are clearly too positive or
negative in their outlook. Secondly, the questions are worded in a way that encourages respondents to
compare the situation in their economy against the best-performing economies in the world, rather than
considering the absolute performance of their economy. Thirdly, companies are selected whose size and
scope guarantee that their business executives are not only familiar with the current conditions in their
country, but also have knowledge and experience of the global environment. Hence it is argued that they
are well positioned to judge their economy￿ s position relative to that prevailing in others. Every e⁄ort is
made to ensure that the sample of respondents is representative of the national business sector in each
country. In order to achieve this, the World Economic Forum has established collaborative partnerships
with a network of over 130 institutions around the world.
3.2 Control variables
We include ￿rm and industry characteristics in regression (1), and ￿rm and country characteristics in
regression (2). The ￿rm-level control variables include ￿rm size measured in terms of the log of the number
of employees (Employees), labour productivity (LabourProductivty), and ￿rm export participation and
intensity (Exporter and ExportShare respectively). The industry-level control variables (all measured
10at the two-digit SIC level) include physical capital intensity (PhysicalCapital), human capital intensity
(HumanCapital) and the R&D intensity (R&D) of an industry. R&D is likely to be correlated with
EnvironmentalCosts as a high level of R&D intensity is likely to reduce the resource intensity of the
production process. There may be further linkages if environmental regulations have a signi￿cant impact
on ￿rm behaviour. Firms may respond by investing in green technologies rather than o⁄shoring dirty
production. Hence R&D may have become a substitute for establishing foreign subsidiaries. The ￿nal
industry-level variable is a measure of industry scale economies, de￿ned in terms of value added divided
by the number of ￿rms (ScaleEconomies). Large scale economies would suggest greater bene￿ts to
concentrating production, and thus again by Brainard￿ s (1997) proximity-concentration trade-o⁄, less FDI
might be expected. Likewise, greater economies of scale in resource use should reduce the environmental
costs of production.
Country controls Y are included in regression (2) as these factors may co-vary with the environmental
regulations in place. Again following Brainard￿ s (1997) the proximity-concentration trade-o⁄ theory,
we include in the regression a measure of market size (measured by GDP) and distance from the UK
(Distance). As is standard in the FDI literature, we also include a proxy for labour costs in the form of
per capita income (GDPpercapita). The stock of FDI in the country (FDIStock) is included to capture
agglomeration/congestion externalities to FDI. The importance of agglomeration/congestion externalities
to foreign investment has been extensively developed in the international economics literature (see for
example Goldstein and Gronberg (1984) and Wheeler and Mody (1992)). In addition, following the
factor proportions explanation for FDI we include the average years of schooling to capture human
capital (Education). A large endowment of human capital in a country has been shown to facilitate the
adaptation of foreign technologies (Nelson and Phelps (1966), Benhabib and Spiegel (1994)) and hence
has been found to attract foreign investment (see for example Noorbakhsh and Paloni (2001)). Finally,
we control for the e⁄ect of being a member of the OECD (OECD). The Appendix provides full details
regarding the de￿nitions and sources of all variables.
We then extend the range of country-level control variables by introducing a variety of indices which
intend to capture the general policy environment and institutional infrastructure of the destination coun-
11try. To be consistent with the intangible asset theory of investment we introduce an index which captures
the protection o⁄ered by the legal system and the quality of property rights (LegalSystem). We also
control for the freedom to trade internationally in the host country (Openness) and for the size of gov-
ernment (GovernmentSize). LegalSystem, Openness and GovernmentSize are all obtained from the
Fraser Institute, and rated on the basis of a 1-10 index where 10 denotes greater economic freedom.
Finally, we follow Fredriksson et al. (2003) and Cole et al. (2006) by investigating the role of
corruption (Corruption) in the context of pollution havens. The measure of corruption considered is the
Corruption Perceptions Index published by Transparency International. It relates to perceptions of the
degree of corruption as seen by business people and country analysts and ranges between 0 (highly clean)
and 10 (highly corrupt). The impact of corruption on FDI has been the subject of much debate. On
the one-hand it may increase the risk associated with foreign investment, although on the other-hand it
may o⁄er ￿rms the opportunity to receive special treatment from government o¢ cials seeking bribes. In
particular, ￿rms may avoid ful￿lling environmental regulatory requirements in corrupt states. Hence the
impact of EnvironmentalReg may be conditional upon the level of corruption, which is re￿ ected by the
introduction of an interaction term between Corruption and EnvironmentalReg.
3.3 Descriptive statistics
In total, there are 6,762 UK owned manufacturing ￿rms in the sample,6 which includes 715 MNEs.
MNEs are therefore only a small proportion of the total number of ￿rms (10.6%). The two-digit UK
pollution abatement cost data are available for all of these ￿rms. Only 5,130 ￿rms in our sample are
located in industries in which U.S. pollution abatement cost data are available however, which includes
571 MNEs. Hence when testing the robustness of the results using the U.S. data, the sample size will
fall. Regarding the U.S. data, in 2005 pollution abatement costs totalled $20.7 billion, which for the
same industries compares to $24.7 billion in 1994 (2005 dollars). Hence there has been a substantial fall
in pollution abatement costs over recent years. This is consistent with the possibility that ￿rms have
been investing in green technologies, but it is also consistent with the possibility that by 2005 many
dirty ￿rms had o⁄shored their production, thereby lowering their domestic abatement cost expenditure.
6Here UK ownership is de￿ned in terms of the global ultimate owner being based in the UK.
12Descriptive statistics for the EnvironmentalCosts and the ￿rm-level and industry-level control variables,
are included in Table 1 below.7




EnvironmentalCostsUK 0.0121317 0.0082307 0.0016572 0.0377358 6762
Employees 537.4583 4135.43 1 212000 6762
LabourProductivity 739.4788 20076.86 0.1578947 1307333 6762
Exporter 0.4695356 0.499108 0 1 6762
ExportShare 0.1524958 0.2626586 0 1 6762
PhysicalCapital 13395.9 8247.197 5946.743 60060.73 6762
HumanCapital 0.4032324 0.0636095 0.0861908 0.7138127 6762
R&D 0.0431938 0.081909 0.0023249 0.4167822 6762
ScaleEconomies 1516465 2071231 323795.5 1.41e+07 6762
Note: Descriptive statistics are given for variables in levels, although in the estimated regressions all quantitative variables
enter in logarithmic form
Further descriptive statistics can be used to provide useful information regarding the relationship
between EnvironmentalCosts and the FDI behaviour of ￿rms. Firstly, it should be noted that the
mean EnvironmentalCosts for MNEs is 1.22% whilst for non-MNEs it is 1.16%. Hence MNEs spend
fractionally more on pollution abatement operating costs, although the di⁄erence is not signi￿cant at the
5% signi￿cance level (the t-statistic is 1.825). Secondly, we consider the distribution of MNEs across the
industries with the highest and lowest pollution abatement costs. This is summarised by Table 2. If there
is a signi￿cant pollution haven e⁄ect in the UK, the dirty industry ￿rms are likely to have o⁄shored their
production and therefore a large proportion should have foreign subsidiaries. However, it is clear from
Table 2 that MNEs represent a greater proportion of the total number of ￿rms in the cleanest industries
(11.24%) than the dirtiest (9.53%). Hence the pollution haven e⁄ect does not appear to be strong enough
to dominate other factors in determining ￿rms￿FDI decisions.
In the estimation of equation (2), we consider a sample of up to 109 developed and developing countries.
A full list of these countries is given in Table A1 in the Appendix. MNEs tend to locate their subsidiaries
in a small number of locations. On average the total number of 715 MNEs have subsidiaries in only 3.6
7Although environmental costs are observed at the industry level, Table 1 summarises each ￿rm￿ s observed value for


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































14countries. In addition, subsidiaries are most commonly located in other OECD countries, with 96% of
the 715 MNEs having at least one subsidiary located within an OECD member. In contrast, 76% have
subsidiaries in non-OECD countries. Table 3 provides summary statistics of the country-level variables
included in equation (2). Note that due to missing data the inclusion of Education and/or the policy
variables will lead to a fall in the number of countries included in the sample.




EnviromentalReg 4.19 1.17 2.4 6.7 109
GDP 1256074 8503543 3456 8.82e+07 109
GDPpercapita 15503 14024 706 80471 109
Distance 5829 3863 324 19147 109
OECD 0.26 0.44 0 1 109
FDIStock 83149 194002 75 1634121 109
Education 6.25 3.19 0 12.25 85
Corruption 5.40 2.30 0.30 8.30 107
GovernmentSize 6.05 1.44 2.54 9.18 97
LegalSystem 5.62 1.99 1.79 9.17 97
Openness 7.03 1.12 1.88 9.48 97
Note: Descriptive statistics are given for variables in levels, although in the estimated regressions all quantitative variables
enter in logarithmic form
4 Empirical Results
4.1 Environmental Regulations and the Internationalisation Decision
Table 4 provides the results for the Probit estimation of equation (1). Four di⁄erent speci￿cations are
estimated. Speci￿cation (a) is equation (1), but without the industry-level control variables. Speci-
￿cation (b) then includes the four industry-level controls. Both (a) and (b) assume that the e⁄ect of
EnvironmentalCosts on MNE decisions is continuous. For an alternative assumption that environmental
costs must reach a threshold level before they trigger out￿ ows of FDI, speci￿cation (c) introduces inter-
action terms between dummy variables for medium and high environmental cost sectors (MediumCosts
and HighCosts respectively), and EnvironmentalCosts. Low environmental cost industries are there-
fore the reference category. We consider high environmental cost sectors as the four sectors with the
15highest pollution abatement expenditure. These include leather products (SIC 19), pulp and paper (SIC
21), the manufacture of coke, petroleum and nuclear fuel (SIC 23) and chemicals excluding pharma-
ceuticals (SIC 24 other). Each of these sectors spent more than 3% of their value added on pollution
abatement. For the total sample of 6,762 ￿rms, there are 622 ￿rms in these sectors. For comparison, the
industry with the next highest spending on pollution abatement, basic metals, spent 1.9% of value added
on abatement. We consider low environmental cost sectors as the four sectors with the lowest pollution
abatement expenditure. These industries are publishing and printing (SIC 22), electrical apparatus (SIC
31), radio, TV and communications (SIC 32), and medical and optical products (SIC 33). Each of these
sectors spent less than 0.6% of their value added on pollution abatement. This amounts to 845 ￿rms.
The remaining 5,295 ￿rms are classi￿ed as having medium environmental costs. Finally, speci￿cation
(d) considers whether there is a di⁄erence in response to environmental costs across ￿rms according to
their productivity level, which we capture using an interaction term between EnvironmentalCosts and
LabourProductivity.
As suspected, omitted industry speci￿c factors have a strong bearing on the correlation between
environmental costs and the decision to become a multinational. In regression (a) EnvironmentalCosts
has a negative e⁄ect on the probability of becoming a MNE, the opposite e⁄ect to that predicted by
the pollution haven hypothesis. This result alters in speci￿cation (b), EnvironmentalCosts becomes
insigni￿cant, once we introduce other industry variables. We conclude from these results that if there
is any evidence that environmental considerations are a signi￿cant determinant of the outward FDI
decision of UK ￿rms, it is not as predicted by the pollution haven hypothesis. This might occur because
pollution abatement costs are too small a proportion of total costs to a⁄ect a ￿rm￿ s internationalisation
decision. It might alternatively be argued that the pollution haven hypothesis re￿ ects to a larger extent
a vertical rather than horizontal FDI motive. If for the UK host countries with substantially weaker
environmental standards are geographically distant then the trade costs associated with locating stages
of the production chain in these countries may be prohibitive. Furthermore, there is evidence to suggest
that the most highly polluting industries are not very geographically mobile, or footloose (Ederington et









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































17may simply not be economically worthwhile for UK ￿rms in comparison to say, being located close to
markets (Brainard, 1987).
These conclusions are robust to treating the environmental costs variable as a threshold variable.
There is no evidence of a threshold level to the e⁄ects of abatement costs in speci￿cation (c). High or
medium cost ￿rms do not behave di⁄erently in this respect to low polluters, or to each other, for both
sets of pollution abatement data.8 In addition, speci￿cation (d) suggests there is no evidence for our
sample that the ￿rms￿response to changes in EnvironmentalCosts of the industry is conditional upon
the productivity of their labour. We ￿nd similar results if we interact EnvironmentalCosts with ￿rm
size (not reported).
The control variables are highly signi￿cant across the regressions. As expected larger ￿rms with higher
labour productivity are more likely to become MNEs, as are those which are more globally engaged in
terms of a greater export share. These results con￿rm those found elsewhere in the international trade
literature on ￿rm characteristics and the mode of global engagement (see Greenaway and Kneller, 2007
for a review). Exporting per se however lowers the likelihood that a ￿rm engages in FDI, as indicated
by the variable Exporter which is negative and signi￿cant. This suggests that ￿rms decide to export as
a substitute for establishing foreign subsidiaries, supporting Brainard￿ s (1997) proximity-concentration
trade-o⁄ hypothesis. Firms located in industries that are more physical capital intensive and human
capital intensive are more likely to become MNEs. This suggests that there are countries abroad where
physical and human capital are cheaper, and thus ￿rms in industries which use these factors intensively
in general have more to gain in terms of cost reductions by relocating abroad. In addition, ￿rms in more
research intensive industries are more likely to establish MNEs (R&D is positive and signi￿cant). Hence
R&D appears to be a complement, rather than a substitute, for becoming multinational. Finally, the
ScaleEconomies variable has a negative and signi￿cant relationship with outward FDI: a lower average
market share within an industry increases the tendency to conduct FDI.
In the remaining regressions in Table 4 we test the robustness of these results to the use of U.S.
pollution abatement cost data. As discussed, the U.S. data has the advantage that it is more disag-
8This result is also robust to modelling the variable e⁄ect of EnvironmentalCosts across ￿rms by adding an
EnvironmentalCosts squared term to model (c), rather than using slope dummies.
18gregated.9 The 1994 PACE data is of additional interest because the o⁄shoring of dirty production by
pollution intensive industry prior to 2005 may have a⁄ected the distribution of abatement costs across in-
dustries. Nonetheless, we again ￿nd that the results are broadly unchanged. USEnvironmentalCosts94
is now weakly signi￿cant for speci￿cations (f) and (g), although of the wrong sign. However, similar
to before it becomes insigni￿cant in speci￿cation (h), and is also insigni￿cant if we include the apparel
sector ￿rms (again this is not reported to conserve space). The signi￿cance of the control variables is
also una⁄ected. The only minor di⁄erence is that the interaction term between LabourProductivity and
EnvironmentalCosts becomes weakly signi￿cant, although again it has an unexpected negative relation-
ship. We therefore conclude that the lack of support for the predictions of the pollution haven hypothesis
is robust.
4.2 Environmental Regulations and the Location Decision of MNEs
We use Table 5 to report on a second aspect of the pollution haven hypothesis; where ￿rms that
choose to become multinationals locate their a¢ liates. Model (a) is a simpli￿ed version of equation
(2), which excludes policy variables and the slope dummies. We use controls for the general policy en-
vironment - government size (GovernmentSize), protection o⁄ered by the legal system and property
rights (LegalSystem), and openness to trade (Openness) - in regression (b).10 Due to missing data the
sample falls from 109 to 97 countries. Speci￿cation (c) adds the Corruption measure, and also interacts
this term with the environmental stringency of the destination country (EnvironmentalReg). There
are 96 countries in these regressions. Fourthly, we introduce interaction terms to allow for di⁄erences
between ￿rms in high, medium and low environmental costs industries in their response to changes in
EnvironmentalReg (speci￿cation d). Again, low environmental cost industries are the reference cate-
gory. 196 MNEs are classi￿ed as low cost, 443 are medium and 76 are high. Finally, speci￿cation (e) also
includes Education. Including this variable results in a further drop in the number of countries to just
76. The ￿rm-level control variables (Employees, LabourProductivity, Exporter and ExportShare) and
industry dummies are all not reported to conserve space.
9Using the 2005 PACE survey data we ￿nd no e⁄ect on the conclusions drawn. These results are available from the
authors on request.
10Two further controls of the policy environment were also considered (macroeconomic stability and the extent of regu-
lation of credit, labour and business). However, these variables were generally found to be insigni￿cant, and at the same
time introduced multicollinearity problems. Hence they are excluded from the analysis presented here.
19Table 5: Probit estimation of the location decision of MNEs
Variables (a) (b) (c) (d) (e)
EnvironmentalReg .0006247 -.0007761 -.0021464 -.0016573 -.0015061





GDP .0006497 .0010176 .0008359 .0008211 .0009886
(7.34)*** (7.57)*** (5.93)*** (5.93)*** (5.51)***
GDPpercapita .0000932 -.0006137 -.0011635 -.0011329 -.0013734
(0.53) (-2.47)** (-3.75)*** (-3.72)*** (-2.64)***
Distance -.000506 -.0013613 -.0011354 -.0011091 -.0013147
(-6.11)*** (-8.83)*** (-7.13)*** (-7.08)*** (-6.32)***
FDIStock .0020183 .0026464 .00253 .0024868 .0027857
(12.41)*** (12.20)*** (11.94)*** (11.86)*** (9.30)***
OECD .000962 .0003856 .0005369 .0005174 .0002763
(3.27)*** (1.09) (1.54) (1.51) (0.67)
GovernmentSize .00077 .00051 .0004962 .0005843
(6.97)*** (4.92)*** (4.88)*** (4.78)***
LegalSystem .0018184 .0020016 .0019692 .0025518
(10.20)*** (10.73)*** (10.69)*** (9.83)***
Openness -.0010414 -.0009861 -.0009693 -.0006661
(-5.97)*** (-6.21)*** (-6.21)*** (-2.70)***
Corruption -.0016044 -.0016063 -.0009703
(-4.25)*** (-4.32)*** (-1.85)*




Observations 77935 69355 68640 68640 54340
R-squared 0.3771 0.3777 0.3821 0.3828 0.3789
Note: Reported coe¢ cients are marginal e⁄ects calculated at the mean of the right-hand side variables. Z-statistics from a test of
signi￿cance are given in parenthesis. *** indicates statistical signi￿cance at the 1% signi￿cance level, ** at the 5% level, and * at
the 10% level. Firm controls and industry dummies are not reported to conserve space. All quantitative variables are in logs.
20Before moving to discuss the results for the e⁄ect of environmental regulations on outward FDI we
brie￿ y discuss the results for the other variables included in the regressions. The control variables re-
assuringly have the expected signs. Market size as measured by GDP attracts FDI. MNEs also locate
subsidiaries in countries with a low income per head (GDPpercapita is negative and signi￿cant), indi-
cating that labour costs are important. Again we ￿nd evidence that multinational location decisions
re￿ ect a trade-o⁄ between achieving proximity to consumers and scale economies. In particular, higher
transport costs and tari⁄barriers (as captured by Distance and Openness respectively) make it desirable
to conduct FDI in the target market.11 In common with Wagner and Timmins (forthcoming), we ￿nd
a statistically signi￿cant role for FDI agglomeration e⁄ects. In fact, there are strong positive external-
ities associated with FDI agglomeration. GovernmentSize and LegalSystem both have positive and
strongly signi￿cant e⁄ects, suggesting that countries with small governments and strong legal protection
are preferable to MNEs. Finally, there is some support for the theory that factor proportions are impor-
tant for direct investment, with countries that are skill intensive attracting FDI (Education is positive
and signi￿cant at the 10% level).
From regression (a) we ￿nd there is no evidence in favour of the pollution haven hypothesis. In fact,
conversely it appears as though countries with stringent environmental regulations are more likely to
attract UK MNEs. However, this would appear to be a consequence of other important control variables
omitted from the regression, in particular the policy control variables. If we introduce government size,
protection o⁄ered by the legal system, and openness to trade, we now ￿nd that EnvironmentalReg has a
negative and signi￿cant e⁄ect on the probability of ￿rm location. Conditional on a range of other aspects
of policy we ￿nd the ￿rst evidence that multinational ￿rms are attracted to locations that have lower
environmental regulations.
With the further addition of the corruption variable in regression (c) the magnitude of the deterrent
e⁄ect from environmental regulation even increases. Hence it appears as though even with the inclu-
sion of other policy variables, EnvironmentalReg to a large extent picks up the positive e⁄ect of lower
corruption. Corruption itself is found to deter UK foreign investment. From regression (d) we also ￿nd
11In addition, the possible trade-o⁄ is supported by the result that Exporter (not reported in Table 5) is negative and
signi￿cant, suggesting that ￿rms decide to export to a destination as a substitute for establishing foreign subsidiaries there.
21that the more corrupt the country, the less the deterrent e⁄ect from stringent environmental regula-
tions (Corruption￿EnvironmentalReg is positive and signi￿cant). Again this would tend to support the
pollution haven hypothesis. From speci￿cation (e) there is a possibility that the direct e⁄ect of corrup-
tion arises in part because it is acting as a proxy for human capital (Corruption becomes only weakly
signi￿cant), but both the direct and interaction e⁄ects for EnvironmentalReg are robust.
For speci￿cation (c), the predicted probabilities of establishing subsidiaries in a country range from
0.000 to 0.982 across the 68,640 ￿rm-country combinations, although the mean predicted probability is
just 0.034 (or 3.4%). Hence for the vast majority of observations there is a low probability that the depen-
dent variable SubsidiaryLocation takes a value of 1. This re￿ ects the data, where most multinationals
have a¢ liates located in only a small number of countries. Although the results support the pollution
haven hypothesis with the inclusion of the policy variables, even with corruption included the magnitude
of the e⁄ect of EnvironmentalReg is not particularly large. A 1 unit increase in the environmental
index of an average country reduces the chances of an average MNE locating one or more subsidiaries
there by 0.21% for speci￿cation (c). Considering that EnvironmentalReg only ranges from 2.4 to 6.7
for all the countries in the sample, a 1 unit rise in the index would represent a substantial tightening
of environmental policy. On the other-hand, this e⁄ect is larger than the marginal e⁄ects of the other
variables included in the model which are measured on a similar scale (Corruption, GovernmentSize,
LegalSystem and Openness). Of these variables, only strong protection o⁄ered by the legal system and
high quality property rights (as measured by LegalSystem) has a marginal e⁄ect of a similar magnitude.
When reporting the impact of environmental regulations in the host country on the predicted prob-
ability of a MNE locating there, one should emphasise however, that it is highly conditional upon the
level of corruption. We can depict this using Figure 2, which is based on the estimates of speci￿cation
(c). The diagram plots the variable EnvironmentalReg against the predicted probability of location
for three di⁄erent types of countries; a country with a corruption index equal to the lowest value in our
sample (low corruption), the sample average (average corruption), and the highest value in our sample
(high corruption). All other variables are held at their sample means. It is clear from the diagram that
the predicted probability of ￿rm location is almost independent of environmental standards for highly
22corrupt countries, and even for countries with an average level of corruption. On the other-hand, the
relative impact of environmental regulations for a country with a low level of corruption is substantial,
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Figure 2: Role of corruption
Focusing now on speci￿cations (d) and (e), we ￿nd that ￿rms in high, medium and low environmental
cost sectors are heterogeneous in their response to EnvironmentalReg. High cost sector ￿rms are more
strongly deterred from establishing subsidiaries in a country with stringent environmental regulations
than low and also medium cost ￿rms (for speci￿cation (d) the null hypothesis that the coe¢ cients on
MediumCosts￿EnvironmentalReg and HighCosts￿EnvironmentalReg are equal gives a ￿2 statistic
of 3.97, which is rejected at the 5% level). Hence the more costly it is to comply with UK environmental
regulations, the more attractive countries with weak environmental regulations become. It is perhaps
surprising to ￿nd that even for the low cost sector there is a statistically signi￿cant deterrent e⁄ect from
23EnvironmentalReg. However, it is arguably not economically signi￿cant, and is not found to be robust
in some speci￿cations reported later, in which we estimate separate regressions for the high, medium and
low cost sectors.12
A further robustness check is provided by Table A2 in the Appendix, which repeats the estimations
reported by Table 7 using year 2000 country variables. Recall that Figure 1 suggests a large proportion
of the MNEs in our sample may have made their decision to establish foreign subsidiaries in the late
1990s. Hence it might be more relevant to measure the country variables at this time, rather than in
2005.13 However, in 2000 the Executive Opinion Survey had a smaller country coverage, and hence the
regressions in Table A2 include fewer countries (57 countries for speci￿cations (a), 56 for (b) and (c) and
50 for (d)). Year 2000 country variables Distance and OECD are no di⁄erent to 2005, whilst Education
also takes the same values as in the previous regressions as it was previously being measured for the year
2000.
The estimation results given by Table A2 suggest that environmental regulations have a stronger
role to play in determining the location in which UK MNEs establish foreign a¢ liates than previously
estimated. For example, for speci￿cation (c), a 1 unit increase in EnvironmentalReg now decreases the
probability of location by 0.58%, evaluated at sample means. This marginal e⁄ect is nearly three times
that estimated by the corresponding regression in Table 5. To put this into context, the average predicted
probability of a MNE locating in a destination country is 5.5%, which is higher than before as there are
fewer countries in which MNEs only very rarely establish subsidiaries. Furthermore, speci￿cations (d)
and (e) tell us that the threshold e⁄ects of being a ￿rm in a medium or high environmental cost sector
are also stronger than before. For instance, (e) tells us that increasing EnvironmentalReg by 1 unit
reduces the probability that ￿rms in the high environmental cost sector establish foreign subsidiaries in
that destination by 0.46% more than low cost sector ￿rms. The corresponding percentage in Table 5 was
12Table 5 models the heterogeneity between ￿rms of di⁄erent environmental costs by introducing dummy variable inter-
action terms. This implies the existence of thresholds in EnvironmentalCosts beyond which ￿rms behave di⁄erently. To
test whether this relationship is more appropriately modelled as a continuous change between ￿rms we tried interacting
EnvironmentalCosts with EnvironmentalReg. The results generally remain robust. In fact, the magnitude of the direct
deterrent e⁄ect from EnvironmentalReg is now much greater than in Table 5.
13In the Executive Opinion Survey 2000, business executives were separately asked to assess the stringency of the "overall
pollution regulations" in their country, and to assess whether "environmental regulations are enforced consistently and
fairly", rather than incorporating both aspects into a single question. Both questions were again on a scale of 1 to 7. We
therefore take the average of these two indices to form our single index EnvironmentalReg.
24just 0.12%.
Overall, there is strong evidence that the impact of EnvironmentalReg on the location decision of a
MNE varies according to environmental compliance costs. This may also apply to the control variables.
To further investigate heterogeneity in the behaviour of the ￿rms in this respect, Table 6 reports separate
regressions for high, medium and low environmental cost sectors. There are also other advantages to
separating the sample in this way. For instance, it is now possible to calculate the marginal e⁄ects of
changes in the right-hand side variables separately for each group of ￿rms.
Table 6 reveals di⁄erences in the behaviour of each group of ￿rms. For the high compliance cost
sector, the bias from omitting corruption is particularly evident; EnvironmentalReg is insigni￿cant for
speci￿cation (a) but signi￿cant and negative at the 5% level for speci￿cation (b). Moreover, in the case
of the latter, the magnitude of the coe¢ cient is nearly double that estimated by the equivalent pooled
regression (speci￿cation (c) in Table 6). A 1 unit increase in the environmental index now reduces the
probability that a MNE in a high environmental cost sector will establish subsidiaries in a country by
0.37% with corruption included. Although the deterrent e⁄ect from environmental regulations is also
signi￿cant for the medium and the low cost sector for speci￿cation (b), the magnitude of this e⁄ect is
lower than that for the high cost sector. For medium cost polluters, the marginal impact of a 1 unit
increase in the environmental index reduces the probability of location by 0.26%, and for low polluters by
just 0.10%. These marginal e⁄ects imply that the probability of location compare to a mean predicted
probability of 4.7%, 3.3% and 3.1% for high, medium and low environmental cost ￿rms, respectively.
The estimation results discussed suggest that ￿rms are less likely to locate subsidiaries in a country
with stringent environmental regulations. Hence maintaining tough environmental standards may lead to
a loss of jobs and production which would otherwise have been attracted to the country if environmental
standards were weaker. In this respect, there is evidence of a pollution haven e⁄ect. It implies that
governments can use environmental regulations as a policy tool to attract or discourage pollution intensive
FDI. However, this result does not necessarily imply that there are countries that have become pollution
havens, because it is conditional upon many other country variables. For instance, UK MNEs in high (as
well as medium and low) environmental cost sectors are attracted to countries which o⁄er strong legal
25Table 6: Probit estimation of the location decision of MNEs for high, medium and low environmental
cost industries
High Environmental Costs Medium Environmental Costs Low Environmental Costs
Variables (a) (b) (a) (b) (a) (b)
Employees 0.0050672 0.0044094 0.0022868 0.0021197 0.0014545 0.001345
(7.28)*** (6.55)*** (12.27)*** (11.48)*** (6.38)*** (5.85)***
LabourProductivity -0.0016611 -0.0014718 0.000223 0.000205 0.0001094 0.0000756
(-2.44)** (-2.45)** (1.56) (1.54) (0.71) (0.53)
Exporter -0.0091178 -0.0081376 -0.0031038 -0.0028543 -0.0043855 -0.0040099
(-3.10)*** (-3.05)*** (-5.38)*** (-5.25)*** (-4.18)*** (-3.99)***
ExportShare 0.0000448 -0.0000366 0.0068407 0.0063486 0.0038326 0.0034533
(0.02) (-0.01) (8.80)*** (8.47)*** (4.83)*** (4.53)***
EnvironmentalReg -0.0007038 -0.003715 -0.0011017 -0.0025779 -0.0001837 -0.0009808
(-0.68) (-2.01)** (-4.10)*** (-5.22)*** (-0.71) (-2.09)**
GDP 0.0016669 0.000835 0.0008899 0.0007551 0.0009308 0.0008674
(2.53)** (1.32) (5.21)*** (4.15)*** (4.55)*** (3.81)***
GDPpercapita -0.0023958 -0.0030769 -0.0007414 -0.0013579 0.0001806 -0.0002232
(-1.94)* (-2.15)** (-2.31)** (-3.35)*** (0.54) (-0.52)
Distance -0.0017113 -0.0009578 -0.0015834 -0.0013874 -0.0007577 -0.0006901
(-2.35)** (-1.40) (-7.52)*** (-6.29)*** (-3.87)*** (-3.18)***
FDIStock 0.0053291 0.0054066 0.002669 0.0025689 0.001726 0.0015882
(5.22)*** (5.37)*** (9.56)*** (9.35)*** (5.49)*** (5.22)***
OECD 0.0029749 0.0032537 0.0010679 0.001121 -0.0010261 -0.0008419
(1.39) (1.60) (2.08)** (2.20)** (-2.89)*** (-2.38)**
GovernmentSize 0.0014245 0.0007499 0.0007778 0.0005321 0.0004889 0.0003651
(2.58)*** (1.53) (5.42)*** (3.89)*** (3.28)*** (2.51)**
LegalSystem 0.0022373 0.0033746 0.0018304 0.0020222 0.0014161 0.0014076
(2.91)*** (4.06)*** (8.04)*** (8.39)*** (5.03)*** (5.03)***
Openness -0.0008535 -0.0009393 -0.0009562 -0.0009381 -0.0010672 -0.0009818
(-0.99) (-1.27) (-4.27)*** (-4.55)*** (-4.14)*** (-3.98)***
Corruption -0.0029135 -0.0017765 -0.0009565
(-1.57) (-3.58)*** (-1.85)*
Corruption*Environ. 0.0008654 0.0003813 0.0001835
(2.93)*** (5.03)*** (2.45)**
Observations 7372 7296 42971 42528 19012 18816
R-squared 0.3743 0.3836 0.3742 0.3782 0.3766 0.3803
Note: Reported coe¢ cients are marginal e⁄ects calculated at the mean of the right-hand side variables. Z-statistics from a test of
signi￿cance are given in parenthesis. *** indicates statistical signi￿cance at the 1% signi￿cance level, ** at the 5% level, and * at
the 10% level. All quantitative variables are in logs.
26system protection and high quality of property rights. These countries are characterised by stringent
environmental regulations (the correlation between EnvironmentalReg and LegalSystem for the 96
countries included in the sample is 0.79, which is signi￿cant at the 1% level). On the other-hand,
countries with weak environmental standards also have a lower per capita income (the correlation between
EnvironmentalReg and GDPpercapita is 0.76, again signi￿cant at the 1% level), and ￿rms in the
high environmental cost sector tend to invest in such countries due to lower labour costs. In fact, for
speci￿cation (b), just a 1% fall in GDPpercapita of an average country leads to a 0.31% rise in the
chances of an average MNE in the high cost sector locating subsidiaries there. Arguably this is far more
economically signi￿cant than the impact of EnvironmentalReg. Hence developing countries might be
more likely to become pollution havens to dirty industry because they have lower labour costs rather than
because they have weak environmental regulations. For some this might be seen as semantics. Put simply,
the results suggest that developing countries may become dirtier due to UK FDI, although principally in
order to take advantage of lower production costs rather than weak environmental standards. Meanwhile,
for low environmental compliance cost industry we ￿nd that GDPpercapita is insigni￿cant, despite the
fact that clean ￿rms are often thought of as labour intensive (see for example Cole and Elliot, 2005).
In contrast to GDPpercapita, the measure of market size (GDP) is a robustly signi￿cant determinant
of MNE location for the low environmental cost ￿rms, while it becomes insigni￿cant for the high cost
sector ￿rms once we introduce Corruption. This suggests that when low cost ￿rms locate abroad they do
so with the aim of expanding into new markets, thereby strengthening their position in a global context.
This possibility is supported by the result that low cost industry is more likely to locate subsidiaries in
destination countries that are less open to free trade (Openness is negative and signi￿cant). Hence low
cost sector ￿rms are establishing subsidiaries in order to access closed markets which cannot be easily
served by exporting. This is not the case for the high cost industry, for which Openness is insigni￿cant.
Moreover, it is more globally engaged low cost sector ￿rms that are more likely to locate subsidiaries
in a foreign country (i.e. they have a greater export share). In contrast, for high cost sector ￿rms
ExportShare is insigni￿cant.
Other di⁄erences between the low and high environmental cost sectors include that a smaller size
27of government in the destination country￿ s economy attracts low cost sector ￿rms (GovernmentSize is
positive and signi￿cant). We interpret this result as showing that ￿rms in low cost sectors are attracted
to countries with more market-friendly policy environments. That GovernmentSize is insigni￿cant for
high cost sector ￿rms for speci￿cation (b) might therefore again indicate that they are more concerned
with o⁄shoring production rather than accessing new markets.14;15
4.3 Methodological Robustness Check: Conditional Logit Model Estimation
Thus far we have conducted Probit estimations of the location decision. This implicitly assumes that
a given MNE makes an independent decision about whether or not to establish subsidiaries in each
individual host country. It may be more appropriate, however, to model the ￿rm￿ s location decision as a
choice among the M alternative countries in the dataset. The conditional Logit model (CLM) allows us
to model the location choice of MNEs in this way.
Typically, in a CLM the individual makes only a single choice, assumed to be that which maximises
utility. However, the nature of our dataset is such that a number of choices may be observed, i.e. MNEs
often establish subsidiaries in more than one destination country. We therefore follow the location choice
literature (for example, Becker et al., 2005) by assuming that the management of each MNE delegates the
location decision to a number of decision makers who individually select a single location for investment
out of the M alternative countries. Clearly these individual location decisions are likely to be correlated
for each MNE. We therefore allow for clustering, such that observed location choices are assumed to
be independent between MNEs, but not necessarily independent within an individual MNE￿ s location
decisions.




im = Vim + "im
for countries m = 1;:::;M. Here, Vim is the deterministic component of the utility that ￿rm i derives
14As before, we test the robustness of the results reported in Table 6 to using country variables measured in the year
2000. As was the case for the pooled regression, we ￿nd that the magnitude of the e⁄ect EnvironmentalReg has on the
probability of MNE location increases using 2000 data.
15An additional robustness check was also performed by introducing the measure of education in the destination country
into speci￿cation (b). The results are not reported due to reasons of space, but for high, medium and low environmental
cost ￿rms this measure of human capital was found to be insigni￿cant at the 10% level, and did notably a⁄ect the estimation
results.
28when choosing to establish subsidiaries in country m, and "im is the random component. The general
form of the utility function Vim can be given as:
Vim = zm￿ + xi￿m + ￿m (3)
where zm contains values of the independent variables for country m, and ￿ contains the e⁄ects of
the country-speci￿c variables. ￿m is a country-speci￿c ￿xed e⁄ect. One approach to including ￿rm
characteristics would be to create a characteristics variable which varies across countries. This would be
achieved by de￿ning a series of dummy variables dim = 1 if country = m, and 0 otherwise. A series of
pseudo-attributes xim is then generated from the individual characteristics xi in the following way:
xim = dim:xi for all m = 1;:::;M
The set xi = fxim;m = 2;:::;Mg is then included, alongside the genuine attributes zm, in the utility
speci￿cation Vim. xi1 is dropped to avoid collinearity. Hence in formula (3), xi contains the ￿rm-speci￿c
independent variables for ￿rm i, and ￿m contains the coe¢ cients for the e⁄ects on country m relative to
the base country m = 1. Further details can be obtained in Long (1997).
In the case of our sample, there are up to 109 countries included in the estimation equation. We
therefore need 108 interaction terms for each of the ￿rm-level and industry-level variables. Clearly this
would generate far too many explanatory variables. To simplify the model, we therefore group the
destination countries into 10 regions; North America, Western Europe, Central and Eastern Europe,
Australasia, Africa, East Asia, South Asia, Central and South America, the Caribbean, and the Middle
East. We then generate pseudo-attributes xir for regions r = 1;:::;10, rather than the M countries.
Hence we rede￿ne the set xi = fxir;r = 2;:::;10g, and include this in formula (3), which now takes the
form:
Vim = zm￿ + xi￿r + ￿r
such that ￿r is now a region-speci￿c ￿xed e⁄ect, and ￿r contains the coe¢ cients for the e⁄ects of ￿rm
characteristics xi on region r relative to the base region r = 1. In this way, the CLM allows us to judge
how ￿rm characteristics in￿ uence the region the ￿rm decides to invest in, rather than the speci￿c country
within that region. Clearly, country characteristics are still included as determinants of the location
29choices made within regions.
It is assumed that the location choices yi 2 f1;:::;Mg relate to stochastic utilities U￿
im through an
observability criterion which states that:
yi = m if U￿
im = maxU￿
ij for j = 1;:::;M
This leads to the following general expression for the probability Pr(yi = mjxi;zi) of the ith decision
maker choosing country m:
Pr(yi = mjxi;zi) = Pr(U￿
im = maxU￿
ijjxi;zi)
To derive expressions for each Pr(yi = mjxi;zi), and consequently estimate the parameters of Vim, it is
assumed that each "im is distributed as an independent extreme value. In this case, McFadden (1974)
showed that the predicted probability of a decision maker choosing to locate in country m is:




exp(zj￿ + xi￿1) +
21 X
j=19
exp(zj￿ + xi￿2) + :::
where ￿1 = 0. j = 1;:::;18 for the ￿rst region (Western Europe) as there are 18 countries in this region,
j = 19;:::21 for the second region as there are 3 countries in this region (North America), and so on for
all regions.
The estimation results for the conditional Logit model are provided by Table 7. Speci￿cations (c)
and (d) allow the impact of environmental regulations in the host country to vary according to the
environmental compliance costs of the MNE￿ s industry. As noted above, the ￿rm-level control variables
(Employees, LabourProductivity, Exporter and ExportShare) are included as interaction terms with
dummy variables for 9 regions. The base (omitted) region is Western Europe. However, these interaction
terms are not reported in Table 7 in order to conserve space. In addition, speci￿cations (b), (c) and
(d) include the industry control variables (PhysicalCapital, HumanCapital, R&D, ScaleEconomies),
again as a set of interaction terms, but again omitted to conserve space. Finally, all four speci￿cations
also include region-speci￿c constant terms (again not reported).
The CLM provides evidence which is supportive of the conclusions derived from the Probit estimations.
EnvironmentalReg has a statistically signi￿cant deterrent e⁄ect across all four speci￿cations, which
30Table 7: Conditional Logit estimation of the location decision of MNEs
Variables (a) (b) (c) (d)
EnvironmentalReg .5591913 .5557851 .1687808 .1254678
(-5.19)*** (-5.21)*** (-6.84)*** (-7.60)***
EnvironmentalReg*EnvironmentalCosts .7786982 .7451874
(-4.88)*** (-5.53)***
GDP 1.32813 1.326092 1.335186 1.438009
(5.82)*** (5.76)*** (5.85)*** (6.10)***
GDPpercapita .973944 .9651558 .9590622 .8632405
(-0.20) (-0.26) (-0.31) (-0.83)
Distance .6771946 .6798619 .677786 .6877399
(-4.67)*** (-4.57)*** (-4.57)*** (-4.17)***
FDIStock 2.024151 2.046796 2.043366 1.889841
(10.26)*** (10.37)*** (10.18)*** (7.37)***
OECD .9637939 .956307 .9520774 .9757893
(-0.29) (-0.35) (-0.39) (-0.17)
GovernmentSize 1.176013 1.176698 1.170883 1.158484
(4.38)*** (4.32)*** (4.18)*** (3.70)***
LegalSystem 1.999444 2.025347 2.032542 2.391964
(9.00)*** (9.15)*** (9.14)*** (11.45)***
Openness .8237648 .8195388 .8239058 1.07926
(-3.06)*** (-3.12)*** (-3.01)*** (1.00)
Corruption .7352564 .7336644 .7049015 .8250329
(-2.78)*** (-2.75)*** (-3.10)*** (-1.41)
Corruption*EnvironmentalReg 1.118411 1.120587 1.128947 1.1137
(6.27)*** (6.30)*** (6.83)*** (4.81)***
Education 1.550995
(2.00)**
Impact of EnvironmentalCosts on location in following regions
North America .841105 1.006087 .9082606 .8918387
(-1.68)* (0.04) (-0.70) -0.81
Central and Eastern Europe 1.265116 1.261869 .8254111 1.049146
(1.45) (1.00) (-0.81) (0.20)
Australasia .6915465 .7411033 .7454333 .737837
(-1.80)* (-1.18) (-1.15) (-1.20)
Africa 1.46433 1.472592 .9719772 1.18079
(1.56) (1.28) (-0.10) (0.52)
East Asia .8891209 1.488568 1.113816 1.02403
(-0.85) (2.05)** (0.55) (0.11)
South Asia .8468182 .8217915 .5667906 .522709
(-0.62) (-0.52) (-1.52) (-1.63)
Central and South America 1.642703 2.127067 1.490025 1.40172
(2.67)*** (2.94)*** (1.54) (1.28)
Caribbean 3.952666 2.776004 1.538268 1.428723
(1.30) (0.86) (0.36) (0.29)
Middle East .6713116 1.250259 .9447153 .2670305
(-0.82) (0.47) (-0.12) (-1.78)*
Industry variables No Yes Yes Yes
Observations 88608 88608 88608 68856
R-squared 0.4092 0.4147 0.4165 0.4196
Note: Coe¢ cients are odds ratios. Z-statistics from a test of the signi￿cance are given in parenthesis. *** indicates statistical
signi￿cance at the 1% signi￿cance level, ** at the 5% level, and * at the 10% level. Other ￿rm and industry interaction terms
omitted to conserve space. All quantitative variables are in logs. Western Europe is the base region.
31regressions (c) and (d) suggest is stronger for MNEs in industries with higher environmental compliance
costs. More speci￿c interpretations can be provided by the odds ratios given in Table 7. The odds ratio
associated with EnvironmentalReg is 0.56 for both (a) and (b). This has the following interpretation:
increasing the environmental index by one unit for a given country decreases the odds that a MNE will
establish subsidiaries there by 44%, holding the values for all other countries constant. This rises to
49% for both (a) and (b) if Education is added as a control variable to these regressions (not reported).
Compared to the interpretation of the marginal e⁄ects provided by the Probit regressions based on the
same data, the magnitude of this e⁄ect appears to be far more economically signi￿cant. However, it must
be taken into account that this apparent large change in the odds only applies to a very small probability
of location (the mean predicted probability of these models is around just 1%). Referring to speci￿cation
(c), the results tells us that if the logarithm of the environmental costs of an industry is 1 unit higher,
MNEs in this industry are deterred from investing in a country by an additional 22% following a 1 unit
rise in EnvironmentalReg. This rises to 26% for once we also control for Education (speci￿cation (d)).
The interaction terms between EnvironmentalCosts and the various regions can be interpreted in
the following way. For speci￿cations (a) and (b), a 1 unit increase in the logarithm of the environmental
costs of a sector increases the odds of a MNE in that sector locating in Central and South America
over Western Europe by 64% and 113% respectively, holding all else constant. (Here the logarithm of
environmental costs only ranges from -6.4 to -3.3 across all the manufacturing sectors and hence a 1 unit
increase implies substantially more environmental costs.) This could suggest that Central and South
American countries may have become pollution havens to UK MNEs. However, speci￿cations (c) and (d)
￿nd no robustly signi￿cant role for EnvironmentalCosts in a⁄ecting region choice. Hence the results do
not support the hypothesis that the environmental costs of a MNE￿ s industry a⁄ects the region in which
it invests. This is consistent with the evidence from Table 4 regarding this aspect of the pollution haven
hypothesis.
5 Conclusion
In this study we have examined whether environmental standards in￿ uence UK ￿rms￿FDI behaviour.
We have found some robust support for some aspects of the pollution haven hypothesis. No evidence has
32been uncovered to suggest that ￿rms in industries with high environmental compliance costs are more
likely to become MNEs, despite the possibility of taking advantage of environmental regulation that is
relatively weak abroad compared to the UK. However, once the ￿rm has decided to become a MNE,
there is evidence of a statistically signi￿cant pollution haven e⁄ect. That is, ￿rms are deterred from
investing in potential host countries if they operate stringent environmental regulations, ceteris paribus.
This deterrent e⁄ect is far stronger for ￿rms in higher environmental compliance cost sectors, although
falls dramatically the greater the level of corruption in the host country. Moreover, the magnitude of
the pollution haven e⁄ect grows when we use year 2000 data, at which time many of the MNEs in our
sample may have made their location decisions. This suggests that environmental regulations are indeed
a useful policy tool to reduce the pollution intensity of UK FDI that a host country receives.
Although the estimation techniques used in this paper do overcome many caveats to previous empirical
work, there are nonetheless further problems which might potentially remain. These include that we
cannot control for unobservable plant ￿xed e⁄ects. In addition, there may be unobservable country
characteristics that are correlated with both environmental regulation and investment which would bias
the results. Another problem is that the o⁄shoring of production is in practice a dynamic phenomenon.
However, our ￿nding that the results are robust to using country variables from the year 2000 suggests
that this problem may not necessarily a⁄ect the conclusions drawn by this paper.
6 Appendix
Dependent variable
SubsidiaryLocation :Presence indicator by country and ￿rm, which takes a value of 1 if the ￿rm has
at least one foreign manufacturing a¢ liate in the respective host country.
Environmental variables
EnvironmentalCosts :Logarithm of pollution abatement operating costs (PAOCs) per unit of value
added. This is taken from the UK Environmental Protection Expenditure survey, with value added
data from the OECD Structural Analysis (STAN) database. The survey de￿nes PAOCs as all in-house
expenditure in 2005 associated with the operation of pollution control abatement equipment and payments
to external organisations for environmental services. This includes labour costs, leasing payments and
maintenance costs for equipment and payments made to others for the treatment and disposal of waste.
Environmental spending also does not include spending on health and safety. It does not include any
spending where the primary purpose is other than environmental protection.
The data are based on a strati￿ed random sample of 7,858 companies, drawn from the Inter Depart-
mental Business Register (IDBR) held by the O¢ ce for National Statistics (ONS). Companies with 1 to
9 employees were excluded. The total number of validated responses was 1,466. By taking the ratio of
PAOCs to value added, the data accounts for industry size. PAOCs are measured at (approximately) the
two-digit SIC level.
33EnvironmentalReg :This is a qualitative measure taken from the 2006 Executive Opinion Survey
conducted by the World Economic Forum. It ranges from 1 to 7 where 1 is de￿ned as "lax compared to
most countries" and 7 as "among the world￿ s most stringent". In total, 11,232 responses were used for
the 2006 survey, which featured 125 developed and developing countries. The survey was conducted in
the early months of 2006. The coverage of countries included in the Executive Opinion Survey increased
in 2007. Therefore, in order to maintain as broad a sample as possible, and since the stringency of envi-
ronmental regulations tends not to change substantially from year-to-year, observations were considered
for countries which were not included in 2006 but added into the survey for 2007. Observations from
2007 are used for Oman, Saudi Arabia, Uzbekistan and Senegal.
Firm-level control variables
Employees :Logarithm of total employees.
LabourProducitivity :Logarithm of labour productivity, de￿ned as turnover per employee.
Exporter :A 0/1 indicator which takes the value 1 if the ￿rm exports and 0 otherwise.
ExportShare :Share of exports in total output.
Industry-level control variables
PhysicalCapital :Logarithm of physical capital intensity, measured as non-wage value added per
worker, 2005:
(value added - total compensation of employees)/employees
Source of these data: OECD database.
HumanCapital :Logarithm of human capital intensity, measured as share of value added paid to
skilled workers, 2005:
((total compensation of employees)/value added) - ((unskilled wage￿employment)/value added)
Source of these data: OECD database.
R&D :Logarithm of research and development expenditure divided by value added, 2005. Source:
ONS, Business Monitor, MA14.
ScaleEconomies :Logarithm of value added per ￿rm, 2005. Source: ONS, Annual Business Inquiry.
Country-level control variables
FDIStock :Logarithm of annual accumulated stock of total inward FDI in millions of U.S. dollars,
2005 Source: UNCTAD World Investment Report.
GDP :Logarithm of GDP measured in millions of U.S.$ at PPP exchange rates, 2005. Source: IMF.
GDPpercapita :Logarithm of GDP per capita measured in units of U.S.$ at PPP exchange rates,
2005. Source: IMF.
Distance :Logarithm of geodesic distance. This is calculated following the great circle formula, which
uses the geographic coordinates of the capital cities. This variable also incorporates internal distances
based on areas. Source: CEPII (http://www.cepii.fr/).
OECD :A 0/1 indicator which takes the value 1 if the country is in the OECD and 0 otherwise.
Education :Logarithm of the average schooling years in the total population over 25 years old in 2000.
Source: updated version of Barro and Lee (2000).
Corruption :Transparency international Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), 2005. The CPI score
relates to perceptions of the degree of corruption as seen by business people and country analysts. The
CPI is based on data gathered over 2003-2005. It ranges between 0 and 10, and has been rescaled for
this study such that 0 is highly clean and 10 is highly corrupt.
GovernmentSize :Index measuring the size of the government in 2004. Rated on the basis of a 1-10
index where 10 denotes smaller government size. Source: the Fraser Institute (www.freetheworld.com).
LegalSystem :Index giving the protection o⁄ered by the legal system and the quality of property
rights in 2004. Rated on the basis of a 1-10 index where 10 denotes greater protection. Source: the
Fraser Institute (www.freetheworld.com).
Openness :Index giving the freedom of the country to trade internationally in 2004. Rated on the basis
of a 1-10 index where 10 denotes greater openness. Source: the Fraser Institute (www.freetheworld.com).
34Table A1: List of countries
Algeria El Salvador Madagascar Senegal
Angola Estonia Malawi Singapore
Argentina Finland Malaysia Slovak Republic
Australia France Mali Slovenia
Austria Germany Malta South Africa
Bangladesh Greece Mauritania Spain
Barbados Guatemala Mauritius Sri Lanka
Belgium Guyana Mexico Sweden
Bolivia Honduras Morocco Switzerland
Bosnia and Herzegovina Hong Kong Mozambique Taiwan
Botswana Hungary Namibia Tanzania
Brazil Iceland Netherlands Thailand
Bulgaria India New Zealand Trinidad and Tobago
Burkina Faso Indonesia Nicaragua Tunisia
Cambodia Ireland Nigeria Turkey
Cameroon Israel Norway USA
Canada Italy Oman Uganda
Chile Jamaica Pakistan Ukraine
China Japan Panama United Arab Emirates
Colombia Kazakhstan Paraguay Uruguay
Costa Rica Kenya Peru Uzbekistan
Croatia Korea Rep. Phillipines Vietnam
Cyprus Kyrgyzstan Poland Venezuela
Czech Republic Latvia Portugal Zambia
Denmark Lesotho Qatar Zimbabwe
Dominican Republic Lithuania Romania
Ecuador Luxembourg Russian Federation
Egypt Macedonia FYR. Saudi Arabia
35Table A2: Probit estimation of the location decision of MNEs using 2000 country-level data
Variables (a) (b) (c) (d) (e)
EnvironmentalReg .0021609 -.0053533 -.0058385 -.0038478 -.0047136





GDP .0021503 .0041064 .003086 .0030543 .003986
(4.67)*** (6.23)*** (4.30)*** (4.30)*** (4.75)***
GDPpercapita -.0024174 -.0045123 -.0054126 -.0054024 -.0083866
(-3.58)*** (-5.88)*** (-5.60)*** (-5.64)*** (-6.80)***
Distance -.0031757 -.0042211 -.0036159 -.0035787 -.0046033
(-7.89)*** (-8.21)*** (-6.45)*** (-6.45)*** (-6.55)***
FDIStock .0119278 .0094094 .0098199 .0097193 .010609
(18.57)*** (12.08)*** (12.13)*** (12.10)*** (11.35)***
OECD .007346 .003123 .0025517 .0025034 .0033739
(5.32)*** (2.24)** (1.87)* (1.86)* (1.94)*
GovernmentSize .0007043 .0007484 .0007364 .001042
(2.15)** (2.22)** (2.21)** (2.66)***
LegalSystem .007562 .0081744 .0081078 .0086914
(11.52)*** (10.48)*** (10.48)*** (9.80)***
Openness -.0007193 -.0011707 -.0011803 -.000815
(-0.86) (-1.41) (-1.44) (-0.84)
Corruption -.0025893 -.0027251 -.0042547
(-1.77)* (-1.88)* (-2.49)**




Observations 40755 40040 40040 40040 35750
R-squared 0.3268 0.3352 0.3364 0.3376 0.3312
Note: Reported coe¢ cients are marginal e⁄ects calculated at the mean of the right-hand side variables. Z-statistics from a test of
signi￿cance are given in parenthesis. *** indicates statistical signi￿cance at the 1% signi￿cance level, ** at the 5% level, and * at
the 10% level. Firm controls and industry dummies are not reported to conserve space. All quantitative variables are in logs.
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